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ABSTRACT 
The need for Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) in accomplishing joint 
missions by coalition militaries, law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the 
private sector creates a unique challenge to providing access control. In this thesis we 
investigate the capabilities and limitations of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to 
control the dissemination of SSA in a coalition environment.  Our case study is that of 
controlling access to SSA in the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) environment. 
MDA exemplifies both rapid change in membership of coalitions and the roles of 
coalition participants. We explore the access policy and roles played by the participants 
in the MDA environment, in addition to the characteristics of those roles. We make use 
of feasible scenarios to provide us with a base for applying models to the situation. The 
models that are applied to the scenario provide the formal methods that prove that RBAC 
policies and derivatives such as Distributed Role Based Access Control (DRBAC), 
Coalition Based Access Control (CBAC) and Temporal Role Based Access Control 
(TRBAC) can be used in conjunction with the Information Broker (IB) concept to 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The need for Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) in accomplishing joint 
missions by coalition militaries, law enforcement, the intelligence community, and the 
private sector creates a unique challenge to providing access control. In this thesis we 
investigate the capabilities and limitations of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to 
control the dissemination of SSA in a coalition environment.  Our case study is that of 
controlling access to SSA in the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) environment. 
MDA exemplifies both rapid change in membership of coalitions and in the roles of 
coalition participants. We explore the access policy and roles played by the participants 
in the MDA environment, in addition to the characteristics of those roles.  
The CG MIFC and the Navy TENCAP project Radiant Alloy supplied valuable 
advice and data in the development of scenarios for the case studies. The models that are 
applied to these scenarios provide the formal methods that prove that RBAC policies and 
derivatives such as Distributed Role Based Access Control (DRBAC), Coalition Based 
Access Control (CBAC) and Temporal Role Based Access Control (TRBAC) can be used 
in conjunction with the Information Broker (IB) concept to provide adequate access 
control policies.  
We determined that an interlinking between RBAC (and its derivatives) and 
Information Brokers is not only possible, but also highly desirable. Elements of DRBAC 
and CBAC are most suitable for alignment with the Information Broker, especially when 
designing a system for coalition use. It is scalable to large data sets and can include large 
quantities of entities and roles. DRBAC is especially useful for coalition environments in 
that it can limit information to members that have lower clearances or when combined 




























I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the feasibility of applying a Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) policy (or a derivative of it) onto the Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) project using case studies and formal methods. Additionally, this 
thesis will explore the tenants of the Information Broker and the Radiant Alloy program 
and how they may relate or assist in the MDA program. Finally, this thesis will assess the 
feasibility of the benefits of RBAC assisting in the development of the Radiant Alloy 
program. The policies, project, and program mentioned above will be discussed in further 
detail later in this thesis.  
This chapter will first provide background information on MDA, the Information 
Broker, Radiant Alloy, and a brief discussion on sensor networks. Next, this chapter will 
discuss Shared Situational Awareness and how the different actors play roles in providing 
and using information to create a common operating picture, thus providing all users with 
the most accurate an up-to-date information. RBAC, Distributed Role Based Access 
Control (DRBAC), Coalition Based Access Control (CBAC), and Temporal Role Based 
Access Control (TRBAC) will work together to control this access and is the focal point 
of this thesis. The final section of this chapter will provide a brief introduction to the rest 
of the paper.  
 
B. BACKGROUND  
This thesis addresses the challenge of providing access control in a coalition 
setting in which membership in the coalition and the roles are in constant flux.  The scope 
of this thesis is limited to an investigation of the application of Role-Based Access 
Control (RBAC) for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). MDA is concerned with 
maintaining a worldwide common intelligence picture (CIP) of maritime traffic via a 
distributed network of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems.  
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MDA supports Maritime Domain Protection (MDP), which involves the use of MDA to 
safeguard the security of the U.S. and its allies. 
MDA spans dozens of issues – from missile defense and counterterrorism 
to cargo and container security, from drug trafficking and immigration to 
fishing rights and search and rescue.1
Numerous government and non-government entities are participating in MDA. 
Within the United States, the MDA effort has to date been spearheaded by the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Coast Guard, and Navy.  MDA is not a completed 
solution, but an ongoing project aimed at solving the complex problems defined 
throughout the following sections. 
1. Maritime Domain Awareness 
The main goal of MDA is to identify, monitor, and track vessels as they approach 
the maritime borders of the United States. Knowing where they have been, what they are 
carrying, where they have stopped and tracks they have taken to get there will aid in 
preventing a terrorist attack. The United States cannot search and inspect every piece of 
cargo that enters the United States, so we must perform risk-based decision making with 
data gathered from our sources.2 The United States must be able to abstractly push out 
our maritime borders in order to provide our assets with more time to make decisions and 
search vessels of interest and must possess awareness of vulnerabilities from the water 
and related threats: this must be done without disrupting the lawful and legitimate 
commercial traffic that transits through international and US territorial waters. 
The threats the United States faces at its maritime borders are similar to threats at 
other points of entry. We must protect ourselves from people, cargo, and the vessels 
themselves.3  Implementing MDA will help protect our borders from these threats. MDA 
involves the collection, processing, and evaluation of large amounts of data from a wide 
 
 
1 Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory Web Site. Available from 
<http://www.jhuapl.edu/newscenter/aplnews/2004/summer_MDA.htm> (accessed 19 September 2004). 
2 Vice Admiral Thomas H. Collins.  United States Naval Institute Speech. April 3, 2002. Available 
from <http://www.uscg.mil/COMMANDANT/Maritime%20Security%20Plan%20USNI%20040302.htm> 
(accessed 19 September 2004). 
3 Vice Admiral Thomas H. Collins. 
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spectrum of sources. The data must be fused and given security labels and markings 
before it can be disseminated to government and non-government organizations (NGOs). 
Each particular government organization or NGO will have personnel with different 
needs for access to the CIP. Due to the fact that the CIP will be maintained in distributed 
electronic repositories, there needs to be computer security mechanisms in place to 
broker access to the contents of the repositories. There is a time value associated with 
each piece of data contained in the CIP repositories, so the access-control and other 
dissemination mechanisms must be consistent with the time-budget requirements for 
accomplishing the MDP mission. 
2. Maritime Domain Awareness at NPS 
The Maritime Domain Awareness research initiative at the Naval Postgraduate 
School is concerned with possible courses of action with regards to maritime terrorism. 
There are numerous research projects underway at NPS including Command and Control, 
Port Security and Infrastructure, data tagging and data fusion, and systems design and 
multi-level security. Our thesis addresses the issue of access control to the open-source 
and possibly data repositories comprising the MDA CIP.  In the course of our research, 
we met with representatives from the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) 
located in Alameda, California and with representatives from the Navy Tactical 
Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) to investigate the possibility of 
employing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to serve as a means for protecting the 
confidentiality and integrity of the MDA CIP. Although multilevel security (MLS) is a 
major focus within the TENCAP program, we chose to limit the scope of our thesis to 
investigating the application of RBAC to MDA.  We do, however, offer a discussion 
within the thesis of MLS issues as they pertain to the application of RBAC to MDA 
3. MDA and the Coast Guard 
While visiting MIFC, we were provided with a copy of a document entitled 
“Defining a Common Intelligence Picture for the United States Coast Guard: A Port 
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Perspective.”4 The document contains a description of roles and positions within MDA 
and the process that occurs when tracking and boarding suspect vessels. The following 
question is addressed within the document:  What policies, relationships, and information 
flow processes must be in place in order to develop a CIP supporting MDA for any given 
Coast Guard captain of the port’s area of responsibility (AOR)?  The author of the 
document recommended that the information gap be bridged between the various parties, 
operating in different administrative domains and under different legal authority, in order 
to maintain and utilize the MDA CIP.  Members of the Radiant Alloy Project are 
developing a system to manage the CIP and other resources via automated information 
brokers.  In our thesis we explore RBAC in the context of information brokering.  
4. Information Broker 
The Information Broker is an information-management service that will act as an 
intermediary between the requester of the information and the data repository. The IB 
will provide the requester with the data and at the same time, shield the source of that 
data from the requester. It is a black-box approach that will satisfy the data requests and 
protect the source. The IB must be able to deal with a myriad of clearances and classified 
data. It may range from unclassified all the way to the highest Top Secret 
Compartmented Information. Additionally, there will be users of the system who have the 
full range of United States clearances but it must also provide information to allied 
nations or even to non-government organizations. Within the context of this thesis, there 
are two proposed modes in which the Information Broker utilizes RBAC. The primary 
mode for the Information Broker is to be the intermediary through which the data is 
specifically requested by the user.  This is the concept this thesis will use during the 
modeling stage. The other mode that is not explicitly used in the models is the automatic 
piping mode. Data is automatically sent to roles fitting a certain approved profile. 
5. RBAC and Radiant Alloy 
One of the objectives of the Radiant Alloy Project is to develop operational views 
of an information broker strategy that will enable TENCAP to achieve certification and 
 
 
4 Lieutenant Michael E. Bennett. Defining a Common Intelligence Picture for the United States Coast 
Guard: A fPort Perspective. (Joint Military Intelligence College, August, 2003). 
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accreditation for MDA-CIP-type systems at Protection Level (PL) 5.5  The information 
broker (IB) serves as an information-management service:  it acts as an intermediary 
between the requester (or consumer) of data and the producer or repository of data. The 
IB provides the requester with the data and at the same time, shields the source of that 
data from the requester. The IB must manage access to the data in repositories, both by 
classification level and compartment. More broadly speaking, an information broker is 
the key component of the Broker Architectural Pattern (BAP).  The BAP is intended to be 
used to structure distributed software systems with unlinked mechanisms that interact by 
remote service invocations.  The broker component is responsible for coordinating 
communication, such as forwarding requests, as well as transmitting results and 
exceptions. 
MDA has the requirement to provide information across domains, to include 
entities such as government organizations and NGOs. Further, access to data repositories 
must be simple and efficient, but provide for local as well as coalition-based enforcement 
of access-control policy. Radiant Alloy is a tool that attempts to solve this problem. It 
could be used to support military, humanitarian, law enforcement, and intelligence 
missions. Within Radiant Alloy, RBAC provides a mechanism for managing access 
permissions by way of roles that users play, rather than on a user-by-user basis. Each IB 
within MDA can have its own RBAC policy, as well as Meta rules for managing RBAC 
policy updates and enforcement between Information Brokers. 
6. MDA Information Broker and Sensor Networks 
The chain of events that lead up to a user accessing data in a repository starts with 
sensors. Sensors and human intelligence (HUMINT) provide the raw data that is 
eventually turned into useable information. Sensors are remote, proximal, or in situ and 
MDA will mostly deal with the first two. In situ sensors, or sensors that are right there in 
close proximity to their destination, are not too important within MDA. Sensors also have 
different levels of classification and there will be situations in which the overseeing 
 
 
5 Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/3. Protecting Sensitive Compartmented Information 
within Information Systems. (June 1999).  
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authority does not want the end user to know where the data came from. The path 
between the data source and the data sink must not be known. For example, if there is 
satellite coverage provided by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that is 
classified Top Secret, that data is provided to the information broker who shields the 
NRO from being identified as the source of the data. The information brokering concept 
is also not a single, centralized repository. It consists of many data sources 
communicating via many Information Brokers and sharing data. For example, if a user 
requests information that is not accessible through any of the Information Brokers that 
the organization uses, IB’s have the capability to query other IB’s for the requested data.  
The data would then be processed through the secondary IB back through the 
organization IB and to the user. The term secondary information broker does not mean 
that it is a less privileged secondary clearinghouse for information, but simply another IB 
that is not the user's primary information broker (see Figure 1).  Any Information Broker 
can be either primary or secondary, depending on the source of the data request.  
The MDA system is an event-driven system-of-systems.  Part of that system-of-
systems is a distributed network of heterogeneous sensors. The owners of the sensors—
U.S. and foreign governments, non-government organizations, and private industry--each 
have their own level of security labels and have sensors or sources that may be classified 
or controlled in some manner. In any case, what is important is that the data gets to the 
right user (or role) so that it can be processed and appropriate action can be taken. It does 
not make sense for the user to go directly to the sensor's repository to gather the 
information, but to go to the user’s own repository to query for that data. It is also 
beneficial for the user to 'sign up' for updates of interest to the user to be delivered 
automatically; this can be done through the use of user profiles and database triggers. It is 
unreasonable to expect the sensor repositories to do this. It will be the job of the 
information broker to provide the updates as they happen or to query the appropriate 
secondary information broker. The Information Broker can poll the sensor repository or 
receive updates based on the occurrence of events; the update method should be 
transparent to the end user.  Using RBAC, the administrator can establish data attributes 
for the user and extend those attributes to meet data classification types and gain access 





Figure 1. Information Broker with Sensor Network 
 
 
C. SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
The need for Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) among coalition militaries, law 
enforcement, intelligence, and private sectors creates a unique problem within access 
control. There is a need for SSA within MDA because of the vast quantity of data and 
intelligence that could be fused to track ships and their cargo. The multitude of agencies 
involved require up-to-date and correct information to best coordinate actions and 
interdiction, ultimately protecting the security of the United States and its allies. In this 





of coalitions to SSA; the term “coalition” is used in this thesis to include all of the 
organizations that are or could be involved in conducting MDA, including militaries, law 
enforcement agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private industry, and foreign 
governments.  Both the membership within coalitions and the roles of all participants can 
be fluid.  Thus, it is necessary to be able to adjust access to SSA data accordingly. We 
use a case-study approach to gain an understanding of the MDA environment and the 
requirements for SSA. We then turn our attention to exploring the access policy and roles 
played by the participants in the MDA environment, in addition to the characteristics of 
those roles (e.g., the frequency and magnitude of change, the differences between roles 
across administrative domains, and Meta roles). For example, there can be many 
organizations and roles within the organizations for which accessing views of the 
operational picture of New York Harbor will be necessary.  However, a role defined 
within the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) or the New York 
Police Department (NYPD) may have the same name but different responsibilities 
(including need-to-know for data sharing) and the access policies between PANYNJ and 
NYPD may differ at any point in time. How do we address non-equivalence of roles and 
inconsistencies in policies across administrative domains?  Can we enforce RBAC policy 
across administrative domains?  Does RBAC help us here?  We will try to answer these 
and other related questions 
 
D. RBAC ACTORS  
RBAC provides a means to simplify management of access control to shared 
objects within information systems.  In the past, access control was managed on a user-
by-user basis. RBAC policy relies on explicit definition of roles that users of an 
information system play in an organization; that is, access to shared objects is associated 
with roles (e.g., “tactical action officer”), not individual users (“LCDR Smith”). Users 
gain access to data based on their current role. A role can be defined by position, rank, 
authority, responsibility, or leader. It may be a generic role or a specific position. This 
role can then be mapped to accepted universal standards. Accordingly, different coalition 
members and their organizations (e.g., law enforcement, military, intelligence, NGO, 
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shipping companies, port authorities) could also be mapped to the same standards, 
allowing them to share as well as access data they need. To accomplish this, we have 
chosen three categories of actors that must be defined: Intelligence, Law Enforcement 
and Military. An actor is any individual or group participating in a specific activity 
related to the current operation. Specific roles within these categories will be defined in 
scenarios later in this thesis. 
1. Domestic Categories of Actors 
a. Intelligence  
Intelligence focuses on information gathering, analysis, and dissemination 
about potential threats. This data will be used by both homeland defense and homeland 
security personnel to determine boarding requirements.6
b. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement accesses entry and exit data and takes appropriate 
actions on foreign nationals who have overstayed their legal duration. Law Enforcement 
is utilized to prevent, investigate, apprehend or detain individuals suspected of breaking 
laws that fall within the realm of MDA. Law enforcement encompasses a wide range of 
agencies including, but not limited to, local police, FBI, Drug Enforcement Agency, 
United States Customs and Border Protection and the United States Coast Guard. 
c. Military 
Military assets work with the Department of Homeland Security and 
various American federal agencies in identifying, tracking, interdicting, and/or boarding 
targets of interest.  
2. Foreign Categories of Actors 
a. Intelligence  
While working with domestic intelligence, foreign intelligence provides 
data on potential targets of interest as they depart foreign countries. They work closely 
 
 
6 Homeland defense refers to the military aspect of protecting the homeland in addition to intelligence 
activities conducted against non-U.S. persons, whereas homeland security encompasses the use of law 
enforcement and intelligence resources to protect the homeland. 
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with domestic intelligence to provide information that will be used to determine ships of 
interest. 
b. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement accesses entry and exit data and takes appropriate 
actions on foreign nationals who have overstayed their legal duration. Apprehends 
individuals placed on watch lists. 
c. Military 
Military assets work with the Department of Homeland Security and 
various foreign governments/agencies in identifying, tracking, interdicting, and/or 
boarding targets of interest.  
3. Private Categories of Actors 
a. International Shipping. 
International shipping will help in self identification and possibly 
contribute to intelligence gathering.  
b. Transportation Industries 
Transportation industries (air, sea or rail) will update entry and exit data 
on foreign nationals and uses watch lists to prevent entry to terrorists. Transportation 
industries will also notify appropriate law enforcement agencies upon identification of 
any individual who has been placed on a watch list. 
c. Non-government Organizations (NGO) 
A non-governmental organization is an organization which is not part of a 
government. Although the definition can technically include for-profit 
corporations, the term is generally restricted to social and cultural groups, 
whose primary goal is not commercial.7
NGO’s provide passive intelligence gathering on potential threats based 





7 Wikipedia.org. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-governmental_organization> (accessed 12 April 
2005). 
E. RBAC POLICY ENGINE  
The scope of our thesis is the application of RBAC within an MDA structure to 
support access control in a dynamic coalition environment. Figure 2 shows how actors 



































Figure 2. Actors and SSA 
 
 
An interdiction chain is a progressive set of methodical steps used to counter 
potential threat-ships (see Figure 3). We first address the problem, then provide analysis 
of the problem and domain, and lastly take that data and put it into a model called 





8 Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin, L. Port, E. Keenan, and V. Karamcheti.  DRBAC: Distributed Role-based 
Access Control for Dynamic Coalition Environments. In Proc. 22nd Int. Conf. on Distributed Computing 



























Figure 3. Interdiction Chain 
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F. SUMMARY  
The background of MDA as examined throughout Chapter I has reinforced that it 
is not a completed solution, but an ongoing project. The entire scope of MDA (including 
its current state as well as what it seeks to achieve) is much too broad a topic to consider 
within the confines of this thesis. For the purposes of this study a simplification of MDA 
is needed to supply a context in which to study RBAC, Information Brokers, Radiant 
Alloy, etc. as they might apply to MDA. To accomplish this we will view MDA as the 
active and complete system that it seeks to be. This supplies a context for the rest of the 
thesis by allowing references to MDA in the present tense.  
As just stated, Chapter I provided an introduction and background on Maritime 
Domain Awareness, RBAC, Information Brokers and Radiant Alloy. Chapter II further 
explores different forms of RBAC and how it applies to MDA. Chapter III examines the 
13 
 
flow of data and roles in two sample case studies. Chapter IV continues the development 
of the case studies, and demonstrates a systematic formal approach showing that Role-
Based Access Control can be done. Models are used to explain how it can be done and 
why it is appropriate for MDA. Chapter V details the results and contributions of the 
research. Chapter VI provides a summary of the thesis and recommendations for future 
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II. RBAC AND MDA 
A. ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
Let us start with a simple example to explore how RBAC can be used to support 
MDA. In our vignette, Spanish intelligence discovers that a commercial vessel embarked 
for the United States, allegedly loaded with a shipment of anthrax.  Coalition RBAC 
(CBAC) is applied to the data repository and allows the Spanish intelligence community 
to input data about the potential threat into a data repository accessible via the MDA 
system. The ship has already departed, no track was filed, and the ship has been “lost.” 
International shipping companies can access the downgraded data about the name of the 
ship and that it is on a watch list. They can make reports to law enforcement activities 
that the ship has been spotted. Once the ship has been located and tracked, data is entered 
into the data repository and U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel can access the data 
based on their current roles. For example, alerts are sent and the associated watch officers 
on board the Naval or Coast Guard ship can access data appropriate for the situation. It 
will not matter who they are but rather what roles they are playing. On board the Navy 
ship, when the watch is turned over, there is a seamless transition from one watch officer 
to the next. The same thing happens on the Coast Guard ship. The threat ship is tracked 
and approaches the continental United States. The Coast Guard had already been alerted 
and positions a cutter to prepare for a boarding. Other agencies, including local police 
and FBI agents need data related to cargo and crew names; this process has already 
begun. Access is granted to government personnel based on the roles they play. The 
tenants of Temporal Role-Based Access Control (TRBAC) can also be applied in this 
scenario. For instance, specific roles can be activated and deactivated based on situational 
requirements. Similarly, triggers can be applied that activate a role. For example, once 
local law enforcement has been notified via an alert, this would also trigger the activation 
of a federal law enforcement role such as an FBI watch officer.  
RBAC is founded upon associating permissions with roles, and users are made 
members of roles. The genesis of RBAC can be traced to the emergence of multi-user and 
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multi-application on-line systems. The assignment and membership principle mentioned 
in the first sentence is central to simplifying the management of permissions; this would 
be applicable to MDA as it is not known whether the current multilevel security is the 
best way to administer a large collection of users and accesses. Traditional Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC)9 and Mandatory Access Control (MAC)10 may not provide the 
degree of agility required within the MDA program to update access-control policy. DAC 
policies, which allow users to control access to their own files, do not fit well into a role-
defined system. MAC policies made by a system to control access to objects of different 
secrecy labels are also too rigid for the changing MDA coalition members.  RBAC 
policies could adopt portions from each as necessary. The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) concluded in 2001 that RBAC addresses the needs of many 
commercial and government organizations.11
RBAC also facilitates security administration and review. RBAC makes it 
possible to predetermine role-permission relationships, so that users can be assigned to 
predefined roles. The NIST study determined that permissions assigned to roles tend to 
change relatively slowly compared to changes in user membership roles. Assignment of 
users to roles requires less technical skill than assignment of permissions to roles, thereby 
simplifying the process. This would be beneficial to MDA because user membership 
roles may change often; for instance, there is typically a high turnover rate of military 
personnel. Additionally, more than one person can play the same role concurrently. 
Assigning qualifications and permissions to the roles would be easier than reevaluating 
each person every time the person’s role changes. RBAC’s relationship to MAC and 
DAC is fluid. RBAC is policy-neutral and can have either a MAC or a DAC flavor.   
 
 
9 DAC policies relies on the discretion of the owner of the file to dictate who has a need to know and 
can pass access to the object to other subjects.  
10 MAC policies protect objects by assigning sensitivity labels to those objects and comparing the 
labels to the level of sensitivity of a subject and grants access accordingly. 
11 D. Richard Kuhn, Chandramouli Ramaswamy,  David F.Ferraiolo, Serban Gavrila, and Ravi 
Sandhu. Proposed NIST Standard for Role Based Access Control. ACM Transactions on Information and 
Systems Security. Volume 4, Issue 3. (New York: ACM Press, August 2001), 249. 
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The base model of RBAC includes a user, a role, a session, and permission. A 
user in this model is a human. A role is a job function or a duty within some organization. 
A tactical watch officer on a Coast Guard cutter would be an example of a role. A session 
occurs when a user activates some subset of roles that he or she is a member of.  A 
permission is a particular mode of access granted to one or more objects in the system: 
they are always positive and confer the ability to the user to perform some action (e.g., 
read, write, or delete a specific data item or type of data).  The RBAC model captures the 
following types of relationships: many-to-many permissions to role assignment and 
many-to-many users to role assignment. There is a function that maps each session to a 
single user. Each session also gets mapped to a set of roles.   
Hierarchies are also a part of RBAC. They are used to structure roles to reflect an 
organization’s line of authority and responsibility. They form a partial order relationship, 
which means they are reflexive (role inherits its own permissions), transitive, and anti-
symmetric (redundant). The hierarchy ensures that we are not able to establish a session 
with any combination of roles resulting in escalated privileges.  
 
B. FORMS OF DISTRIBUTED ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
Under the umbrella of Distributed Role-Based Access Controls (DRBAC), we 
will examine DRBAC concepts explored by Freudenthal et al. as well as a derivative 
form, Coalition-Based Access Control (CBAC).   
Distributed Role Based Access Control is a scalable, decentralized trust 
management and access control mechanism for systems that span multiple 
administrative domains.12
1. DRBAC 
The need to share information and resources in a coalition environment led to the 
development of the DRBAC model. The term “coalition” refers to organizations or 
nations collaborating together in order to achieve a common goal. Coalition members 
 
 
12 Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al., 411. 
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directly share their resources with other members without having to go through a third 
party. Using DRBAC to control resources raises three problems that must be overcome: 
• There must be different levels of access to accommodate different 
organizational structures in coalition members 
• Trusts must be tracked and monitored to allow for revocations 
• There needs to be an automatic distribution of credentials to allow 
members of a coalition to establish trust relationships 
“Traditional role-based access control systems depend upon a central trusted 
computing base administered by a single authority.”13  This methodology does not scale 
well to the potential size and complexity of coalition environments. DRBAC defines 
permissions in terms of roles within an organization. These roles can then be mapped to 
others within the same organization or to equivalent roles within coalition partners. 
As with many other models, DRBAC employs a methodology similar to PKI to 
authenticate delegation certificates. However, DRBAC has three features that make it 
unique. Firstly, it allows coalition members (also called entities) to delegate roles created 
by another entity; this process (also called third-party delegation) provides for scalability. 
Second, scalar values can be assigned to modify access levels to a resource. The authority 
to assign these values can also be delegated. Finally, status updates can be pushed to 
other entities allowing outdated or invalid credentials to be revoked using delegation 
subscriptions.14  
Delegations are published, validated, updated and revoked using DRBAC wallets. 
Wallets are similar in function to PKI certificates and can store many delegations (see 
Figure 3 for an example of a wallet). 
 
              
 
 
13 Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al., 411. 










Figure 4. DRBAC Wallet15 
 
Proof monitoring is an important concept within the wallet architecture. A proof 
monitor is a call back mechanism that provides for continuous monitoring of a trust 
relationship. When proof of a relationship is required, an entity can request a proof of a 
relationship through the proof monitor.16 The concept of a proof monitor is closely 
related to the Information Broker idea. When verification of a relationship is required, the 
Information Broker can verify the trust relationship and determine if it is still valid. If it is 
not still valid, the relationship can be revoked or a further investigation commenced to 
verify the trust.  
2. CBAC 
Coalition Based Access Controls (CBAC) can be seen as an offshoot of DRBAC. 
It was designed to support the concept of secure sharing or resources between different 
organizations. Specifically, the goal of CBAC was to accurately capture inter-
19 
 
                                                 
 
15 Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al.,  414. 
16 Ibid., 416. 
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organizational (coalition) relationships. Examples of some entities that might form 
coalitions include private businesses, government agencies, corporations, foreign 
governments, etc. 
The inherent shortcoming of RBAC which led to the development of CBAC was 
that RBAC does not provide an abstraction to capture a set of collaborating users, 
operating in different roles which in our examples can be applied to coalition 
environments.17 The entities which CBAC focuses on are Roles, Teams and Tasks. 
Within CBAC there are three key definitions: 
• Role – a role captures a coherent aspect of an individual’s job function 
within the organization.  
• Team - a team is a collection of users assigned to various roles and 
working toward the accomplishment of a specific goal. The team 
definition specifies the roles that will be included within the team. 
• Task – a task is a stateful flow of activities that achieve a particular 
function. 
A key difference between DRBAC and CBAC is that CBAC makes use of abstract teams 
or tasks to create dynamic coalitions that are focused on completing a task or solving a 
problem. Coalition entities are formed or associated voluntarily and frequently on a 
temporal or temporary basis.  
 
C. TEMPORAL ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
One can add a temporal dimension to RBAC. If someone is assigned a role that is 
only authorized to be accessed between certain times, the role should only be allowed 
activation during those times. This introduces a need to ensure dependencies are met as 
 
 
17 E. Cohen, R. K. Thomas, W. Winsborough, and D. Shands.  Models for Coalition-Based Access  
Control (CBAC).  In Proceedings of the Seventh ACM symposium on Access Control 
Models and Technologies. (Monterey, CA:  ACM Press, 2002), 97-106. . 
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well. For example, a doctor on night duty may need a nurse on night duty.18 In our MDA 
context, a night tactical watch officer on a Coast Guard cutter (0000-0600) may need to 
correspond with a night FBI watch agent. 
TRBAC is an extension of the RBAC model and the main features are the 
possibility of periodically activating and deactivating a role and defining temporal 
dependencies. These dependencies can be activated by means of a role trigger, so that 
they are automatically executed based on current activations or deactivations of roles.  
The RBAC model used in this paper is the same one proposed by Sandhu.19 It 
consists of four basic components: a set of users, a set of roles, a set of permissions, and a 
set of sessions. When a user logs on, he creates a session. A user can be a member of 
many roles, and a role can have many members. For example, a watch officer on a cutter 
can stand officer of the deck and also Tactical Action Officer, for which different 
information is needed. Of course, a role (night watch) can have many members (the 
qualified watch standers). There is an assignment of a value of priority, high (H) or very 
high (VH) where H< VH, which would dictate the order of processing to ensure that the 
processes are scheduled according to the set temporal policy. An example is as follows: 
(RT1 activate night cutter watch office -> (VH) activate night watch FBI.  
RT1 is a role trigger that states that ‘night watch FBI’ must be active if ‘night cutter watch 
is active.’ Additionally, roles with lower priorities, such as ‘under instruction’ watches 
can also be used.   
A user requests to activate a role and is then permitted access if the user has 
authorization to play the role and the role is active at the time of request. In TRBAC, 
these roles can be immediately executed or deferred to a later time. Additionally, periodic 
 
 
18 Elisa Bertino, Elisa Pierro, Andrea Bonatti, and Elena Ferrari. TRBAC: A Temporal Role Based 
Access Control Model.  Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies. (Berlin, Germany: ACM 
Press, 2000), p 23 
19 R. S. Sandhu, E. J Coyne, H.L. Feinstein, and C.E Youman. Role Based Access Control Models. 
(IEEE Computer, Feb. 1996), 38-47.  
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events and role triggers are prioritized to deal with conflicting actions. Data maintained 
by the system are active roles, deferred actions, actions, events, and triggers.20
 
D. ATTRIBUTE BASED ACCESS CONTROL 
Another form of access control that should be studied for its development of Meta 
rules is Attribute Based Access Controls (ABAC). ABAC grants accesses to services 
based on the attributes possessed by the requester. It can be used as a method of 
representing rules about rules (Meta rules). As opposed to DAC, ABAC uses sets of 
attributes in place of the subjects. Similarly it uses sets of services in the access control 
matrix in place of objects. This is useful in systems in which subjects (roles) are 
identified by their characteristics. In our model this is representative of role attributes that 
are substantiated by DRBAC wallets through Information Brokers. This is potentially the 
most important aspect of ABAC, in that it allows you to build different sets of rules 
which allow Information Brokers to work with each other. ABAC lets you manage the 
rules between the Information Brokers. 
 
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL DISCUSSION 
When employing a RBAC, one should not limit the response options of the 
participants in an MDA coalition. Data flow across the boundaries of administrative 
domains is an important facet to maximizing the benefits of a RBAC policy within MDA. 
As mentioned earlier, several organizations can be involved in an interception event. For 
instance, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) can coordinate with Navy, Coast Guard, local law enforcement, FBI, Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), or United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to align a proper 
response to a suspected threat. The level of coordination necessary among these 
organizations is determined by the quality and type of data gathered.  
 
 
20 Bertino et al., 21-30. 
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The collected intelligence goes through a three step process: collection, analysis, 
and dissemination. During the collection phase, intelligence is gathered by an agency. It 
is likely not very specific and may contain vast quantities of data. It has not been 
substantiated or assigned any likelihood of occurrence. No decision has been made as to 
what agency may require this data. That will occur during the next step, which is the 
analysis phase.  
The intelligence gathered will be analyzed and a determination will be made as to 
the credibility of the threat, and who, what, where, when, why, and how will be attempted 
to be answered. Is the threat real? What kind of cargo might a suspicious ship be 
carrying? What is the nature of the threat? Is the suspicious ship carrying WMD or a 
missile pod or is there no threat at all? These questions will hopefully generate 
intelligence that will create a Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) among the agencies.  
If some of these questions can be answered, different agencies can be brought into the 
loop by unlocking certain roles within certain agencies within the MDA data repository. 
The data will be classified accordingly, further limiting access. The dissemination phase 
now begins where the intelligence is available to those agencies that need it. Decisions 
can now be made by appropriate agencies as to where and when the interception will 
occur. Will it happen in the open ocean? Will the Navy be doing open ocean Maritime 
Interception Operations (MIO)? Will it happen closer to shore where the Coast Guard 
will conduct MIO? The key would be to make every attempt to ensure that the United 
States is not forced into a bad decision as to where and when the boarding will occur, but 
that the decision is made after an analysis of all the available intelligence. Therefore, the 
data must flow through the collection, analysis, and dissemination process quickly and 
efficiently providing the necessary authorities with the required and correct intelligence 
to make a timely and informed decision. Network Centric Warfare involving all elements 
of the battle space and developing speed of command within our forces will play a major 
role in conducting a timely and effective interception operation. 21  
 
 
21 Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka. Network-Centric Warfare: Its  
Origin and Future. Proceedings of the Naval Institute. January, 1998.  
<http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles98/PROcebrowski.htm> (accessed on 12 October 2004). 
Consider the effects of RBAC on a command and control structure. TRBAC, 
CBAC and DRBAC are not policies, but rather variations on the base RBAC model.  
These models can be used to create access control policies that can be applied to facilitate 




Figure 5. Coast Guard MIFC Organizational Chart 
 
 
Figure 5 portrays the basic flow of intelligence and data from a ground up 
approach. This diagram was created with information gathered from a visit to the 





a brief glance at the diagram will provide the reader with an idea of how many roles are 
played within a MDA activity. The system itself must be able to contain information 
classified up to the highest level but must also be able to disseminate intelligence down to 
the lowest possible level. The Information Broker concept could come into play in many 
different ways:  a means for disseminating data via role or user-based profiles; a means 
for controlling access to data within an administrative domain; and a means to control 
access to data that crosses administrative domains. 
The Information Broker as described in the Concept of Operations for Radiant 
Alloy must be able to perform this while protecting its information from untrained, 
uncleared, or malicious users. Data must be able to be exchanged across domains and 
security boundaries within the Information Broker scheme.  The Information Broker must 
protect and disseminate at the same time. RBAC can be applied to the Information 
Broker in order to manage, distribute, and enforce policies inherent within them. 
Additionally, roles can be added and managed by one central Information Broker. Roles 
can be created for circumstances and deleted. Data can be shared with allied foreign 
governments or not shared based on levels of trust. Data can be shared with other 
agencies including local law enforcement, the Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Agency, 
and even non-government organizations based on need to know. Policies can be written 
by the main Information Broker and disseminated to local brokers where they will be 
enforced and managed. There are RBAC models based on time, coalitions, and 
distribution. 
In the preceding example, there could be many organizations that branch off of 
the initial report. Local and federal law enforcement would become involved if crime or 
attempted terrorism was suspected. If the cargo was determined to be dangerous to 
civilians in the area, FEMA and other disaster relief organizations may need to be in the 
loop. Every role, however, would not necessarily need all the data that is available. Only 
that which would allow them to do their jobs would be disseminated. This is where the 
Information Broker and RBAC can be utilized.  
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The roles in the Coast Guard example above are many. The legal staff, for 
example, plays a specialized Information Broker between different types of roles, law 
enforcement and defense of the homeland. Data may be forced to travel through a 
specialized data repository and determine which area it applies to. Is it a law enforcement 
role? When does it shift from defense to law enforcement? These decisions would need to 
be made by a legal expert.   
WEBTAS (Web Temporal Analysis System) is a system in use by the Coast 
Guard and can be viewed by anyone with SIPRNET access. It interfaces with a data 
repository and provides up-to-the minute updates on the location of vessels of interest. A 
user can drill down into specific areas in the view to get a closer view of what ships are 
out there. Once a particular ship is clicked on, it will send the user via a hyperlink to the 
details known about the vessel of interest. WEBTAS has an easy to use GUI and provides 
a plethora of information to a multitude of organizations. RBAC could potentially be 
applied to the WEBTAS data repository. The basic set up would be a Secret clearance 
and then different levels could be displayed on a multilevel security system ensuring 
those who meet whatever criteria (is required) would get access to the needed 
information.    
 
F. RBAC ADVANTAGE 
An important question to ask is: Why employ RBAC over other access control 
models? One reason is that RBAC only requires two mappings: roles to permissions and 
users to roles. It does not permit users to be directly associated with permissions. This 
solution can be much simpler to employ over access control lists (ACLs). While access 
control lists have been shown to be technically feasible to use, there are numerous 
disadvantages in using them:  
• Difficult to manage data effectively 
• ACL’s are bound to objects  
• Unable to manage subject-based security policies 
27 
 
                                                
• End users do not own information to which they are allowed access  
• An organization with a large number of users could become an 
administrative nightmare22  
A large organization with many users, who each have permissions, requires a 
large number of user and permission associations. For instance, when a user switches 
positions within an organization, the switching requires a thorough review, addition, and 
deletion of user/permission associations of each server.  In addition, there is an 
administrative cost:23
• U = set of individuals in a job position 
• P = set of permissions required for that job position 
• The number of associations required to directly relate the individuals to 
permissions =  |U| x |P| 
In Role-Based Access Control, this switching within a company is simplified into 
the formula |U| + |P| because the switch only requires two changes by an administrator:  
• Remove user/role association for old job 
• Insert user/role association for new job 
The number of user/role and role permission associations required to authorize 
each user in set U for each of the permissions in the set P (P represents the role) = |U| + 
|P| which is < |U| x |P|.  The summation of the sum of all users and permissions associated 
with the total number of job positions is less than the product of the summation of all 
users and permissions associated with the total number of job positions. The 
mathematical notation looks like this: 24
 
 
22 Chris Agar, Kevin Smith, and Troy Wright. Role Based Access Control. PowerPoint Presentation, 
April 18, 1998.   
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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An example of the previously mentioned advantages of RBAC can be visualized 























Figure 6. MIFC RBAC example one 
 
For these two watch officers, the total number of associations is |2| X |5| = 10. If, 
for example, the IWO (Lt. Smith) becomes a LE Duty Officer, this would require the 
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Figure 7. MIFC RBAC example two 
 
In the case above, the top three blue associations are eliminated and three more 
are added to CTU, International Crime, and Drug Smuggling. This is represented by the 
‘-3’ for deletions and the ‘+3’ for additions. Target Analysis and Fisheries were already 
common associations so they remain the same. The total amount of changes necessary is 
|-3| + |+3| = 6.  Now, in the below diagram, we have inserted two roles, that of 

































Now, if Lt. Smith is to assume the role of LE Duty Officer as above, the 
administrator will only perform two additional associations( |-1| + |+1| = 2) instead of six, 


















Figure 9. MIFC RBAC example four 
 
 
The preceding examples illustrate how employing RBAC can simplify the 
specification, maintenance, and enforcement of access control policy. While employing 
RBAC, one may encounter an initial heavy start up costs as roles are assigned and users 
are mapped to them. However, once that initial mapping is complete, updating the access 
policy and mappings will be much less arduous a task than if the policy and mappings 












G. RBAC AND MLS 
Kuhn26 describes how RBAC can be implemented without any major changes to 
Multi-Level Security (MLS) systems. Hierarchical RBAC can be applied and these roles 
are mapped to MLS labels. In this paper, RBAC is managed at a level that corresponds 
closely to the organization’s structure. As usual, each user is assigned one or more roles 
and each role is assigned one or more privileges. The paper discusses how RBAC can be 
implemented using the controls available on lattice-based MLS systems. According to 
Kuhn’s paper, the mapping of RBAC to MLS categories can be done in a few ways 
depending on the organization’s needs. One way is to establish a mapping between 
RBAC privileges and pairs of MLS categories. If there are 64 categories within an MLS 
system, there will be 2016 privileges which could be mapped to MLS categories.  The 
number of privileges p given n categories is computed as follows: 
2
2
n np −=          (Eq. 2) 
 




nd n n=          (Eq. 3) 
 
Of particular interest to the military is the potential application of RBAC to 
operate simultaneously with a MAC system. In a military system that supports both roles 
and MAC, if a system is labeled system low, the user can activate any process available 
to that role and apply that process to any data for which they are cleared by virtue of the 
MAC policy. In conclusion, the paper states that it is much easier to utilize RBAC as a 
                                                 
 
26 D. Richard Kuhn. Role Based Access Control on MLS Systems Without Kernel Changes. 
31 
 




                                                
single trusted process than to rely on MLS to control access to objects and modify the 
kernel of a secure system or build a system from the ground up.  
As mentioned previously, two of the most commonly used methods for 
implementing access control are Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access 
Control. When examining MLS, a further discussion of these two policies is required.  
The key concept of MAC is that the user does not have discretion as to whether to abide 
by the policy. The system enforces the policy. This is the opposite of discretionary 
policy, in which the user chooses which policy to enforce. In terms of establishing 
multilevel security, we generally are talking about MAC. In general, the purpose of MAC 
is to prevent the unauthorized flow of data (and not much else). RBAC on the other hand 
is more flexible, and can support a variety of policies. It can be used, for example, to 
implement an information flow policy such as MAC, as well as an integrity focused 
policy.27  
We already noted that a role can be seen as a set of permissions (privileges). To 
implement RBAC in a MLS system, there must be a trusted interface that brokers the 
assignment of accesses to resources by users, and that is controlled in accordance with 
the RBAC policy. The trusted interface must map roles and privileges to corresponding 
sets of categories, as shown below. When a user attempts to establish a session, the 








27 D. Richard Kuhn. Role Based Access Control on MLS Systems Without Kernel Changes, 26.  

















Figure 10. RBAC/MLS interface  29 
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF RBAC 
A. USING AN RBAC MODEL SCENERIO #1 
In this section we examine the flow of data and roles as they could pertain to an 
example related to us by members of the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (MIFC) 
located in Alameda, California. The scenario includes roles that are triggered as the 
situation warrants and the type of RBAC that will be initiated. The flow of data and roles 
is described in a flow chart in figure 11. 
The United States Embassy in Hong Kong sends a facsimile to MIFC providing 
intelligence about a boat carrying immigrants who may be heading to the United States 
via Mexico or Central America. The intelligence reports that the ship will be heading 
towards Mexico where the migrants will disembark and then cross by land into the 
United States. The Hong Kong consulate does not regularly communicate with the MIFC. 
The role of ‘consulate’ is established to maintain communications and data flow between 
the two organizations. The facsimile is received by the MIFC ‘watch officer’, a role that 
is already pre-established. The watch officer is the linchpin in providing data to his or her 
superiors and initiating action. This is a common role and will already be activated by the 
watch officer as he or she comes on duty. The fax is then sent by the watch officer to the 
‘tactical analyst’ for review. Again, this role is already enacted as he or she takes the 
watch. The intelligence is analyzed and sent back to the watch officer. The watch officer 
reports to the Command Duty Officer (CDO) and Commander. These roles will again 
already be established. Other important roles that are established include the ‘legal’ role 
and ‘Foreign Affairs Officer’ role to ensure the legality of an impending operation and to 
coordinate with other countries. In this case, a ‘Mexican Law Enforcement’ role needs to 
be established. This is an attribute of CBAC in which data is shared among organizations 
or countries that participate in a given operation. This role would be limited as the United 
States may not want to share all the data that it has, but just enough for the coalition 




The data collected on the suspected illegal-immigration operation is shared 
according to the need-to-know attributable to each role-organization pair (e.g., Mexican 
Navy watch officer may not have a need to know the coordinates of the U.S. Navy ship 
that is tracking the vessel carrying the illegal aliens) for a specific time interval (e.g., the 
Mexican Navy watch officer would not have a need to know once the interdiction 
mission is over). The latter condition is an example of why Temporal Role-Based Access 
Control needs to be employed along with DRBAC and CRBAC.  As the following 
diagram shows, some roles are revisited and new ones are created. New roles include the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent on the ground in Mexico and the 
Field Intelligence Support Team (FIST) which is an entity separate from the MIFC’s 
chain of command. Once the data is shared and looped back to the ‘watch officer,’ he can 
bring in the ‘vessel targeting and analysis team’ to locate and track the vessel of interest. 
This will require the assistance of other organizations such as the U.S. Navy or a foreign 
Navy. The Navies in this example will need to have access to the common operating 
picture and this can be done via CBAC. These organizations do not need to know all the 
details of the operation, just enough to locate and track the target of interest. Finally, once 
all this occurs and the vessel is located, the Coast Guard can perform its boarding; the 
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Figure 11. Scenario #1 
 
 
B. SCENARIO #1 WITH INFORMATION BROKER AND REPOSITORY 
 In this updated version of our scenario, we have introduced the idea of the 
Information Broker and information repository. This improvement upon our previous 
example allows streamlined access for the users of the repository and the providers to the 
repository. For example, in the first occurrence of the Information Broker, the watch 
officer at MIFC sends his intelligence to the Information Broker and is a provider of data. 
The watch officer requests an analysis of the data from his team of analysts who then 
retrieve the data from the repository via the Information Broker. The team of analysts 
conducts its analysis and reports the results of the analysis to the repository where the 
watch officer can retrieve the analyzed intelligence. This may be a simple example of the 
use of an Information Broker, but as the size and complexity of the mission increases, 
there may be a corresponding increase in the number of types and instances of roles (e.g., 
with the inclusion of roles played by Mexican law enforcement and military personnel). 
The Information Broker in our model stores, filters, and retrieves intelligence reports in 


















Figure 12. Scenario #1 with Information Broker 
IB    = Information Broker 
         
 
         = Two way flow of      




C. IMPLEMENTING AN RBAC MODEL SCENARIO #2 
In this section we examine the flow of data and roles as they pertain to a fictitious, 
but potentially realistic situation. The flow of data and roles are described in a flow chart 
on the next page. 
A foreign intelligence organization from the United Arab Emirates notifies the 
CIA that there is the possibility that a merchant vessel left Port Zayed two days ago with 
a concealed missile pod in one of its cargo containers. The missile pod can be exposed 
and be immediately used to target assets ashore and cause immense damage before law 
enforcement or military units can be mobilized to intercept the vessel or the threat 
missile.  It is bound for the Port of Oakland (located in California) and is expected to 
arrive in two weeks. It’s manifest and planned movement has been ‘lost’ or is not 
available. The ship is registered in the U.A.E and is named Sandstorm. It must be located 
and searched. The roles of ‘foreign government’ with numerous sub roles must be 
established. The intelligence is first received from a U.A.E. intelligence agency. Roles 
within the agency are added to the model so that RBAC policy can be specified regarding 
those roles. Since the United States does not want to share all data, it will be on a limited 
basis and Coalition Based Access Control (CBAC) will be utilized. As the situation 
progresses, other entities that become involved include ‘NGOs’ with roles that might 
include the captain of a civilian merchant vessel. U.S. and allied Navies are also activated 
to assist in locating and tracking the vessel of interest. Entities such as Foreign Allied 
governments could have roles that are also activated. Coordination is achieved via The 
U.S. State Department. As the ship proceeds, it is spotted by a US Navy P-3 aircraft 
flying surveillance over the Eastern Pacific Ocean. The P-3 reports its location and name, 
which is in turn entered into the MDA data repository where it triggers a flag to notify the 
Coast Guard that the Sandstorm has been located.   
As this example progresses, entities such as U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) will have activated roles such as ‘Commander’ or ‘Watch Officer’ 
because of the potential threat to the security of the United States. U.S. Pacific Command 
(PACOM), FBI and local law enforcement are all entities from the Oakland area which 
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would have activated roles in this situation. Before the ship comes too close to the shore 
to launch its missiles, it is approached and stopped by a US Navy Destroyer with a Coast 
Guard Law Enforcement Detachment aboard. The information regarding the Sandstorm 
was accessed aboard the destroyer by the Tactical Action Officer with the role of Watch 
Officer. As the ship is boarded by the Coast Guard team, the Captain of the port in 
Oakland is receiving reports from a Sea Marshall and boarding team on the deck of the 
Sandstorm. The roles of Sea Marshall and port Captain are pre-established and are 
activated once they become involved in the interdiction process.  
Finally, after searching the vessel, the missile pod is discovered and arrests are 
made. This is where the law enforcement agencies are included and CBAC is again used. 
Throughout the whole process, TRBAC is used to specify the activation and deactivation 


























D. REASONS FOR COALTION RBAC 
In this paper, the term coalition is used extensively. Our definition of a coalition is 
an alliance (permanent or temporary) formed to achieve a common goal within the 
context of MDA/MDP. It can be between organizations within the same country or 
transcend borders into allied countries. Within a coalition, there are relationships among 
roles that are relatively invariant, for example, the relationship between a watch officer of 
the US Navy and his or her counterpart in the Mexican Navy. Situations can arise in 
which roles from different organizations need to be added or modified (i.e., the 
membership in the coalition in terms of roles can expand or contract) in order for the 
coalition to achieve its mission; the additions or modifications may be permanent or 
temporary in nature.  
In our model, an information repository is a store of data and relationships 
between data controlled by an Information Broker. There are users of the information 
repository and providers of data to the repository. The Information Broker is the interface 
between the users and providers of data to the information repository.  The levels of trust 
are determined on a case by case basis and the levels of details provided to the users of 
the data is determined by the Information Broker and distributed via the information 












E. CORE AND AD-HOC COALITIONS 
Without coalitions, there would be no need for DRBAC or CBAC. All the 
modeling could be done using the RBAC model without any extensions to represent 
group membership. Coalitions formed within MDA can be permanent or ad hoc. 
Membership in coalitions can be permanent or temporary; we refer to the former as core 
members and the latter as transient members.  Members of an ad hoc coalition can be 
created on the fly and are used as events warrant. It is impossible to create core coalition 
members for every possible scenario. Therefore, there must be methods in place that will 
allow for creating transient members and temporary coalitions on the fly. An issue here is 
who is responsible for creating and maintaining these roles.  In our model, we leave the 
“who” up to the conveners of the coalition, but require that the addition and maintenance 
of roles be performed by the Information Broker.  Ownership of an Information Broker 
does not imply authorization to set or change access control policies or add or remove 
members of the coalition. The owner of the IB is concerned only with accessing the data 
located within their repository and enforcing access control policies. 
 
 





























A. DISTRIBUTED RBAC MODEL FOR SCENARIO #1 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate a systematic formal approach 
showing that Role-Based Access Control can be done, explain how it can be done, and 
most importantly explaining why it is appropriate for Maritime Domain Awareness. The 
proof uses the model proposed by Freudenthal et al and will be used as a base for our 
example.30 Existing roles will change and new roles will be defined and there will be 
relationships created between existing role and new roles created outside the 
organization. Our first example will follow scenario #1 presented in the previous section. 
In this example, LT Smith and LT Rivera are fictional characters for fulfilling specific 
roles, MIFC is the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center, and the modeling example 
provided is a small sample space of the roles and organizations involved. The model 
itself is very dynamic and changes as needs require.  
Entities: A public key that represents a principal or a resource, and defines a 
namespace that can contain roles. This namespace encompasses the entire range of 
possible players.  
Form: cryptographic public key and a human-readable name 
Examples: LT Smith; MIFC 
Roles: A name within an Entity’s namespace. 
Form: Entity.LocalName 
Example: MIFC.member 
Role Delegations: Signed Certificates that extend access rights on some object to 
a subject.  Access to an object by a subject can be extended by the issuer of the 
certificate. 
Form: [Subject → Object] Issuer 
                                                 
 
30 Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al., 411-420. 
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An Object is a Role, an Issuer is an Entity, and a Subject is a Role or an Entity. 
Therefore, the issuer of the access rights, in our example the controller of the data 
repository, extends access rights of an object in the data repository to a subject. 
Example: [MIFC IWO → MDA Data repository] MIFC  
Distributed RBAC includes three major types of delegations: 
(1) Self-certified Delegation: An Issuer A grants role A.a to some Subject. The role 
granted is defined within A’s namespace. 
Form: [Subject → A.a] A 
Example: [LT Smith → MIFC.watchOfficer] MIFC   
LT Smith is granted all permissions of the role MIFC.watchOfficer. 
(2) Assignment Delegation: Entity B grants some Subject the right to delegate Role A.a 
to others. The tick (’) indicates that the Subject can further delegate the Role.  
Form: [Subject → A.a’] B 
Example: [MIFC.watchOfficer → MIFC.member’] MIFC  
This effectively allows an entity that possesses permissions to delegate the role 
MIFC.member’ to others as well.  
(3)Third-Party Delegation: In third-party delegation, some Issuer B exercises their right 
to delegate a Role defined in A’s namespace. In this case, A and B are not the same 
entity. In (2), that may or may not be the case.  
Form: [Subject → A.a]B 
Example: [LT Rivera → MIFC.member] MIFC  
In essence, LT Rivera can be granted all the permissions associated with MIFC.member. 
This is granted through the MIFC server which can control access to the MDA data 




Valued Attributes: A name within an Entity’s namespace, disjoint from the role 
namespace that can be set to a numeric value in order to modulate access level is a valued 
attribute. Zero or more Valued Attributes can be set in conjunction with the delegation of 
a Role. 
Form: [Subject → Object with A.Attribute1 <Operator>=<Value> <and B.Attribute2 
<Operator>=<Value>>*] C 
A, B, and C can either be the same entity, or different entities, or any combination 
thereof. The “with” clause specifies the first Valued Attribute in the delegation; 
subsequent attributes are specified using “and” clauses. 
Example: [Mexico.member → MIFC.member with MIFC.shipDes <= S and 
MIFC.ShipCar <= S] MIFC  
In this example a Mexico member is allocated all the permissions associated with a MIFC 
member except (for whatever reason) that the Mexico member can only read details of 
the target ships location within 10 miles and details of the ships cargo classified at or 
below the Secret (S) level.  
Delegation of Assignment for Valued Attributes: These delegations give the 
Subject the right to set the Object Attribute in future delegations written by the Subject. 
While the Valued Attribute is not a Role, the right to set it is a Role, and therefore can be 
the Object of delegations. 
Form: [Subject → Entity.Attribute <operator>=’] Issuer 
Example: [MIFC.vesselTracking → Mexico.vesselTracking -= ’] MIFC  
In the above case, vesselTracking is given the right to modify the Mexico.vesselTracking 
access rights within a set limit. 
Credential Management: These delegation annotations provide mechanisms to 
discover credential chains and control credential lifetime. 
Discovery Tags Form: [Subject<Discovery Tag> → Object<Discovery Tag>] Issuer 
<acting as Role, Discovery Tag> 
Expiration Date: A date after which the delegation is no longer valid. 
Form: [Subject → Object <expiry: date>] 
Example: [Mexico.member → MDA.data repository <expiry 10/10/05>] 
This is used as a tool for tracking expiration dates of roles and access privileges.  
The information below describes the delegations supporting LT Rivera of 
Mexico’s access to MIFC resources.  
 
(1) [LT Rivera → Mexico.member] Mexico  
(2)  [Mexico.member → MIFC.member 
with MIFC.shipDes <= S 
and MIFC.shipCargo  <= S] LT Smith, MIFC 
(3)  [LT Smith, USCG → MIFC.account] MIFC  
(4) [MIFC.account → MIFC.member’ 
with MIFC.shipDes <= ‘ 
and MIFC.shipCargo <=’] MIFC  
(5) [MIFC.member → MIFC.access 
with MIFC.shipDes <= TS 
and MIFC.shipCargo <= TS] MIFC  
  
 
Table 2.   Delegation of LT Rivera’s Access 
 
In Table 2, a full implementation of DRBAC including detection, authorization 
and monitoring is modeled. Mexican Intelligence Agent LT Rivera is able to take 
advantage of a coalition between Mexico and MIFC to obtain data through MIFC. 





                                                
the coalition between Mexico and MIFC as established by LT Smith. Step (2) also 
provides limitations or restrictions as specified by MIFC delegate LT Smith. These 
limitations can be set, removed, or modified on a case by case basis depending on the 
strength or desired strength of the coalition. LT Smith is authorized to provide this 
delegation as described in delegation steps (3) – (5).  
The below diagrams are a distributed proof construction of the initialization and 
final steps in the DRBAC process.  This case study starts off with LT Rivera establishing 
a connection to a MIFC server to access information (step 1).  In this case the foreign 
coalition role of ‘Mexico’ authenticates itself to MIFC using public-key cryptographic 
protocol and requests access to the data on LT Rivera’s behalf by passing on delegation 
(1) which validates LT Rivera as a Mexico.member. To authorize access, the MIFC 
server must find a proof for Mexico.member Ö MIFC.access. When combined with 
delegation (1) proves that LT Rivera is authorized access to applicable MIFC data (LT 
Rivera Ö MIFC.access). 
The MIFC server queries its trusted local wallet for the required proofs as seen in 
step 2. If it fails to find it locally, the wallet attempts to discover the delegations 
necessary to build the proof.  The wallet will contact the home wallet corresponding to 
the role Mexico.member and issue a query and discovers that there is a defined 
relationship between the roles Mexico.member and MIFC.member.  The server wallet 
now has a chain from LT Rivera to MIFC.member. There is still an outstanding 
requirement that would authorize MIFC members to MIFC data (MIFC.member Ö 
MIFC.access). A direct query is issued for a subject to object search involving 
MIFC.member Ö MIFC.access (step 4).  
The results of this query are a self certified delegation. We now have proof 
showing LT Rivera has access to MIFC data (LT Rivera Ö MIFC.access).  
Delegations from this proof are inserted into the local wallet, which is 
trusted to verify signatures and establish its own validation subscriptions 
(step5).31   
 
 
31Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al, 419. 
At this point, limitations and restrictions can be placed on access to data. In our example, 
we arbitrarily assigned the ship’s ultimate destination and cargo as limiting factors. 
Therefore, access to this information could be restricted to Mexican coalition members at 
the Secret level and below.  
In step 6, the proof is returned to the original requester and stored as an object. 
This object allows for the continuous monitoring of delegations authorizing LT Rivera’s 
access. This continuous monitoring could implements the temporal aspects of RBAC, 
















B. DISTRIBUTED RBAC MODEL FOR SCENARIO #2 
The purpose of this section is also to demonstrate a systematic formal approach 
showing that Role-Based Access Control can be done. This proof will be based on 
scenario #2 in which a missile pod is concealed on a tanker ship and is bound for the Port 
of Oakland.  This proof also uses the model proposed by Freudenthal et al and will be 
used as a base for our example.32 In this example, every role and player will not be 
modeled and only a small subset of them will be used. Specifically, LT Smith is again a 
fictional character at MIFC and CDR Thomas is a fictional character at United States 
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32 Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al., 411-420. 
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Northern Command. Even though this scenario does include foreign roles, those roles 
will not be included in this proof.  
Entities: A public key that represents a principal or a resource, and defines a 
namespace that can contain roles. This namespace encompasses the entire range of 
possible players.  
Form: cryptographic public key and a human-readable name 
Examples: LT Smith; MIFC 
Roles: A name within an Entity’s namespace. 
Form: Entity.LocalName 
Example: MIFC.member 
Role Delegations: Signed Certificates that extend access rights on some object to 
a subject.  Access to an object by a subject can be extended by the issuer of the 
certificate. 
Form: [Subject → Object] Issuer 
Object is a Role, Issuer is an Entity, and Subject is a Role or an Entity. Therefore, the 
issuer of the access rights, in our example the controller of the data repository extends 
access rights of an object in the data repository to a subject. 
Example: [MIFC IWO → MDA Data repository] MIFC  
Distributed RBAC includes three major types of delegations: 
(1) Self-certified Delegation: An Issuer A grants role A.a to some Subject. The role 
granted is defined within A’s namespace. 
Form: [Subject → A.a] A 
Example: [LT Smith → MIFC.watchOfficer] MIFC   
LT Smith is granted all permissions of the role MIFC.watchOfficer. 
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(2) Assignment Delegation: Entity B grants some Subject the right to delegate Role A.a 
to others. The tick (’) indicates that the Subject can further delegate the Role.  
Form: [Subject → A.a’] B 
Example: [MIFC.watchOfficer → MIFC.member’] MIFC  
This effectively allows an entity that possesses permissions to delegate the role 
MIFC.member’ to others as well.  
(3)Third-Party Delegation: In third-party delegation, some Issuer B exercises their right 
to delegate a Role defined in A’s namespace. In this case, A and B are not the same 
entity. In (2), that may or may not be the case.  
Form: [Subject → A.a]B 
Example: [CDR Thomas → NORTHCOM.watchOfficer] MIFC  
In essence, CDR Thomas can be granted all the permissions associated with 
MIFC.member. This is granted through the MIFC server which can control access to the 
MDA data repository to a coalition member.  
Valued Attributes: A name within an Entity’s namespace, disjoint from the role 
namespace that can be set to a numeric value in order to modulate access level is a valued 
attribute. Zero or more Valued Attributes can be set in conjunction with the delegation of 
a Role. 
Form: [Subject → Object with A.Attribute1 <Operator>=<Value> <and B.Attribute2 
<Operator>=<Value>>*] C 
A, B, and C can either be the same entity, or different entities, or any combination 
thereof. The “with” clause specifies the first Valued Attribute in the delegation; 
subsequent attributes are specified using “and” clauses. 
Example: [NORTHCOM.watchOfficer → MIFC.member with MIFC.shipDes = 
MIFC.watchOfficer and MIFC.ShipCar = MIFC.watchOfficer] MIFC  
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In this example the NORTHCOM watch officer is allocated all the permissions 
associated with a MIFC member including the data and information pertaining to the 
ship’s destination and cargo equal to that of a MIFC watch officer. 
Delegation of Assignment for Valued Attributes: These delegations give the 
Subject the right to set the Object Attribute in future delegations written by the Subject. 
While the Valued Attribute is not a Role, the right to set it is a Role, and therefore can be 
the Object of delegations. 
Form: [Subject → Entity.Attribute <operator>=’] Issuer 
Example:[MIFC.vesselTracking → NORTHCOM.vesselTracking -= ’] MIFC  
In the above case, vesselTracking is given the right to modify the NORTHCOM 
vesselTracking access rights within a set limit, assuming NORTHCOM is tracking the 
vessel and aware of its progress.  
Credential Management: These delegation annotations provide mechanisms to 
discover credential chains and control credential lifetime. 
Discovery Tags Form: [Subject<Discovery Tag> → Object<Discovery Tag>] Issuer 
<acting as Role, Discovery Tag> 
Expiration Date: A date after which the delegation is no longer valid. 
Form: [Subject → Object <expiry: date>] 
Example: [MIFC.member → MDA.data repository <expiry 10/10/05>] 
This is used as a tool for tracking expiration dates of roles and access privileges.  
The information below describes the delegations supporting CDR Thomas of 




 (1)  [CDR Thomas → NORTHCOM.watchOfficer] NORTHCOM  
(2)  [NORTHCOM.watchOfficer → MIFC.member 
with MIFC.shipDes = MIFC.watchOfficer 
and MIFC.shipCargo  = MIFC.watchOfficer] LT Smith, MIFC 
(3)  [LT Smith, USCG → MIFC.account] MIFC  
(4) [MIFC.account → MIFC.member’ 
with MIFC.shipDes <= ‘ 
and MIFC.shipCargo <=’] MIFC  
(5) [MIFC.member → MIFC.access 
with MIFC.shipDes <= TS 
and MIFC.shipCargo <= TS] MIFC  
 
 
Table 3.   Delegation of CDR Thomas’s Access 
 
In Table 3, a full implementation of DRBAC including detection, authorization and 
monitoring is modeled. NORTHCOM watch officer CDR Thomas is able to take 
advantage of a coalition between NORTHCOM and MIFC to obtain data through MIFC. 
Delegation step (1) identifies CDR Thomas as a NORTHCOM.watchOfficer. Delegation 
step (2) defines the coalition between NORTHCOM and MIFC as established by LT 
Smith. Step (2) also provides limitations or restrictions as specified by MIFC delegate LT 
Smith. These limitations can be set, removed, or modified on a case by case basis 
depending on the strength or desired strength of the coalition. In this case, CDR Thomas 
is authorized to view all the data that a MIFC watch officer is entitled to see. This 





                                                
and NORTHCOM is more trustworthy than the coalition between MIFC and Mexico. LT 
Smith is authorized to provide this delegation of permissions as described in delegation 
steps (3) – (5). 
The below diagrams are a distributed proof construction of the initialization and 
final steps in the DRBAC process.  This case study starts off with CDR Thomas 
establishing a connection to a MIFC server to access information (step 1).  In this case 
the coalition role of ‘NORTHCOM’ authenticates itself to MIFC using public-key 
cryptographic protocol and requests access to the data on CDR Thomas’s behalf by 
passing on delegation (1) which validates CDR Thomas as a NORTHCOM.watchOfficer. 
To authorize access, the MIFC server must find a proof for NORTHCOM.watchOfficer 
Ö MIFC.access. When combined with delegation (1) proves that CDR Thomas is 
authorized access to applicable MIFC data (CDR Thomas Ö MIFC.access). 
The MIFC server queries its trusted local wallet for the required proofs as seen in 
step 2. If it fails to find it locally, the wallet attempts to discover the delegations 
necessary to build the proof.  The wallet will contact the home wallet corresponding to 
the role NORTHCOM.watchOfficer and issue a query and discovers that there is a 
defined relationship between the roles NORTHCOM.watchOfficer and MIFC.member.  
The server wallet now has a chain from CDR Thomas to MIFC.member. There is still an 
outstanding requirement that would authorize MIFC members to MIFC data 
(MIFC.member Ö MIFC.access). A direct query is issued for a subject to object search 
involving MIFC.member Ö MIFC.access (step 4).  
The results of this query are a self certified delegation. We now have proof 
showing CDR Thomas has access to MIFC data (CDR Thomas Ö MIFC.access). 
“Delegations from this proof are inserted into the local wallet, which is trusted to verify 
signatures and establish its own validation subscriptions (step 5).”33  At this point, 
limitations and restrictions can be place on access to data. In our example, we arbitrarily 
assigned  the  ship’s  ultimate destination and cargo as controlling factors.  These factors  
 
 
33Eric Freudenthal, T. Pesin et al., 419. 
could either be limiting or non-limiting. In this case the factors of ship’s cargo and 
destination are non-limiting as access is granted to CDR Thomas up to the MIFC watch 
officer level.  
In step 6, the proof is returned to the original requester and stored as an object. 
This object allows for the continuous monitoring of delegations authorizing CDR 
Thomas’s access. This continuous monitoring could implements the temporal aspects of 
















C. GENERIC TEMPORAL RBAC MODEL 
 Temporal RBAC is another extension of the basic RBAC model. As described in 
section II, part C of this thesis, the features of TRBAC that are important to our modeling 
are that it supports periodic activation and deactivation of roles and the potential of 
specifying temporal dependencies among the activations or deactivations of roles by 





                                                
Bertino et al and their paper on Temporal Role Based Access Control.34 The model 
below is a generic model that is not derived from any specific example, but does use 
MIFC as a base. First, a few definitions must be clarified before commencing the model: 
(1) Event Expressions: have the form activate R or deactivate R where R є Roles.  
(2) Prioritized Event Expressions: have the form p:E where  p є Periodic Expressions 
that denote an infinite set of time instants and E is an event expression or the occurrence 
of some event.  
(3) Role Status Expressions: have the form active R or inactive R, where R є Roles.  
(4) Role Activation Base: a set of elements that include periodic events I (time interval), 
P (periodic expression), and p:E (a prioritized event expression). It will also include role 
triggers that have a simple event expression E, role status expression C, prioritized event 
expression p:E, all over a certain change in time ∆t.  Additionally, the events described in 
the below example have priorities attached to them. The relationship is VH > H > M > L 
where VH is Very High, H is High, M is Medium and L is Low priority. The time to start 
and finish the role activations is indicated within the [ ]. The start date and time is first 
followed by the end time.  
The below figure is an example that shows role activations and triggers over time 
using the symbols defined above and a simple arbitrary example of the watch rotation at 
MIFC. This is a simplified example where there are only two watches, which would most 
likely not be the case.  
(PE1) [1/1/2005:0000, ∞] (Night-time → activate mid-watch IWO) VH 
(PE2) [1/1/2005:0000, ∞] (Day-time → deactivate mid-watch IWO)  VH 
(PE3)  [1/1/2005:0000, ∞] (Day-time → activate day watch IWO) VH 
(PE4) [1/1/2005:0000, ∞] (Night-time → deactivate day watch IWO) VH 
(RT1) (Activate night watch IWO → activate night watch ELINT) 
 
 
34 Elisa Bertino, Elisa Pierro, Andrea Bonatti, and Elena Ferrari, 21-30. 
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(RT2) (Activate night watch IWO → activate night watch SIGINT) 
(RT3) (Activate day watch IWO → activate day watch ELINT) 
(RT4)  (Activate day watch IWO → activate day watch SIGINT) 
(RT5)  (Activate day watch IWO → deactivate night watch ELINT) 
(RT6)  (Activate day watch IWO → deactivate night watch SIGINT) 
(RT7)  (Activate night watch IWO → deactivate day watch ELINT) 
(RT8)  (Activate night watch IWO → deactivate day watch SIGINT after 1hr) 
In Role Trigger 8, we have included an example of extending a role for some unforeseen 
circumstance. For example, if the night IWO wanted to hold the day SIGINT for one 
hour extra for whatever reason, that could be specified in the activation rules.  
The architecture to support the system contains the following data: 
1. Active Roles: Table that contains the current active roles. 
2. Deferred Actions: Table that contains an entry for each action that may be 
executed after a certain amount of time. 
3. Actions: Table that records the actions that can potentially be executed on 
Active Roles. 
4. Events: Records the activation and deactivation of roles 
5. Triggers: Table that contains the specified triggers. 
  














                                                 
 



















A. RESEARCH  RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
1. Lessons in Model Building 
There are many benefits in using varying types of RBAC to build an integrated 
model. In conducting our research, we found that the base system must have some 
minimal level of development in order to even start using RBAC models (to modify the 
base model).  
In constructing our model, we further determined that a full integration of CBAC 
was not necessary or even conducive to achieving our goals. CBAC can be very effective 
in forming teams (coalitions) to solve a problem or achieve a solution. However, our 
model is focused on a gradual development of intelligence, only revealing the problem 
needing a solution very late in the timeline. This makes it virtually impossible to know at 
the onset which organizations need to be involved and at what level of security. 
This made formal use of CBAC in our model prohibitively difficult. Instead, we 
use our formal model of DRBAC to accomplish any required elements of CBAC. In fact, 
we view CBAC as a sub-type of DRBAC in the way it uses roles and tasks. Rather than 
expanding our model to allow us to fully model CBAC, we incorporated the concepts of 
CBAC under the umbrella of DRBAC. 
2. Process for Building a Model 
As a result of our research, we found it best to take an incremental approach to 
applying RBAC principles in order to solve a problem. First, roles are identified and 
mapped to users. We considered creation of each role in terms of what it needed to 
accomplish, or data it needed to access. This in turn leads to permission assignments of 
roles to resource objects (or data within the system). Permissions can be as detailed and 
granular as required to accomplish the desired task. These permissions should reflect 
policy as dictated by the parent organiztion. 
Once the core concepts of RBAC have been applied, aspects of DRBAC and 
CBAC can be applied. The DRBAC delegation model must be established to allow the 
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sharing of data without relying on a central trusted computing base. This is essential in 
coalition environments where a high level of trust may not exist. Credentail management 
must be established, whether in the form of DRBAC wallets as discussed in this thesis, or 
a similar methodology such as PKI. 
The process for implementing a RBAC architecture in a coaltion environment 
requires a basic understanding of the principles of RBAC, TRBAC, and DRBAC. The 
order in which they should be applied is the same. The first step is to lay the foundation 
by initializing RBAC: 
• The administrator of the system that is going to employ an RBAC 
architecture should first complete an analysis of the base roles that will 
be required. This will provide a base building block for implementing 
furter roles and the addition and deletion of current roles.  
• The roles should be identified and given names that correspond to their 
responsibilites or positions.  
• Once the roles have been identified, assign permissions to the base 
roles. This would also include security labels associated with the roles. 
The administrator should expect to modify these frequently based on 
the situation or event.  
• The administrator should allow for the introduction of new roles as 
situations arise. 
TRBAC is the next element that is introduced: 
• As discussed earlier, triggers should be in place that will activate a 
base role upon the occurrence of some events or the activation of 
another role that requires a parallel role.  
• TRBAC requires a time element. Expiration dates and times can be 
included in a role to terminate or extend a role automatically. This 
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would fall under the umbrella of a trigger, only this trigger would be a 
time classification trigger.  
The final element of coalition RBAC is the implementation of DRBAC.  
• DRBAC requires the identification of coalition partners. Base partners 
should be established and identification of future coaltion partners 
within the event needs to be analyzed. 
• Coalition partners should request the type of access required and this 
should be approved by the Information Broker authority, who would 
then set the permissions and assign coaltion roles to existing base 
roles.  
• New roles may need to be established to facilitate the proper access 
required for a coalition partner depending on where they fall within the 
Trust Triangle (figure 14).  
• “Need to know” criteria should be applied, expecially to non 
traditional foreign coalition members who may be included during an 
event specific operation.   
The combining of these three will contribute to a seamless exchange of data and 
information leading to a more efficient coalition environment.  
3. Identification of Gaps 
In developing the model for this thesis, we have identified two key gaps that 
require further exporation. The first was mentioned in paragraph 1 above and has aready 
been discussed, the treatment of CBAC withing DRBAC. 
The second gap is our use of a ‘black box’ Information Broker and requires 
further research. Without access to a fully functioning  Information Broker, we used it as 
a generic black box concept. We use the Information Broker liberally to share data 
between roles within or outside of an organization. Radiant Alloy is one potential tool to 
solve this problem. Full development of Radiant Alloy or the Information Broker concept 
is outside the scope of this thesis.  
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4. Integrating RBAC and the Information Broker 
The integration of RBAC and the Information Broker concept is a realistic 
possibility. RBAC requires that there be a controlling entity to provide or deny access to 
the data or information within a particular data repository. The Information Broker is a 
logical fit. It acts as a clearing house for requesters and providers of data. If applied to the 
MDA program, the Information Broker would have to be cleared at the highest level 
control access using a role based identification system. In essence, the Information 
Broker will have no idea as to what the actual identity of the person is, just that they are 
playing a role that requires access to a certain subset of data within a domain. In order to 
link RBAC and the Information Broker and create a system of systems, there are four 
items that need to be solved: 
1. Identification of roles for a certain event or operation 




3. Security levels 
a. Data 
b. Roles 
4. Time constraint of the operation 
If the Information Broker concept can be applied to RBAC, we must examine the 
possibility of RBAC being applied to the Information Broker and Radiant Alloy. The 
goal of the Radiant Alloy project is for users to gain access to data across organizational 
boundaries and across multiple security levels. Role Based Accessed Control along with 
DRBAC and CBAC can assist in providing a new framework for the Information Broker 
concept. DRBAC is built for coalition distribution of information and data. The roles that 
can be created for coalition partners can have set limitations placed on them to control 
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access to the information that they need to know. The creation of the roles particular to a 
certain event or operation will be the baseline for controlling the flow of information to 
coalition organizations or countries.  The Information Broker can be the intermediary 
between the roles and the data, acting as the gateway to the information repository and 
receiving and filing the data from information providers. This would provide the trusted 
transactions between users of the information repository (who have been assigned to 
established roles with established permissions) and providers whose identity would be 
concealed by the Information Broker.  
5. Components and Linkages 
The system that is required to support RBAC in a coalition environment is a 
transaction based system. Additionally, the Information Broker concept has been added 
to the system structure to assist in the receiving and providing of data (Figure 21). 
Allowing controlled access to the data within a data repository is the job of an 
information system. In this case, the access is controlled and the data is distributed by the 
Information Broker. The information system is modeled using a layered approach and is a 
hybrid between an information system model and a resource allocation model based on 
Sommerville’s model.36 The system that would be applied to the MDA program is not a 
traditional resource allocation system in that the information repository does not contain a 
fixed amount of data that will eventually run out.37 But, the data that is contained in the 
repository is restricted by who it can be delivered to and the users who do have access 






36 Ian Sommerville. Software Engineering, Seventh Edition. (London, England: Pearson Education 
Limited, 2004), 299-303. 
37 A resource allocation system manages a finite amount of an item. Tickets to a football game or a 
concert may be managed by a resource allocation system and the users may request the resource (tickets) 
through the resource allocation system. As tickets are purchased, the system tracks the purchases and 
reduces the resources available for purchase. The resource does not have to be a tangible object. For 














Figure 21. Information Broker as Linkage 
 
The first layer is the user interface layer that provides the mechanism for 
requesting and displaying the appropriate data.  The communication layer is the next 
layer and that processes the request or distributes the information to the appropriate 
location within the repository. The third layer is the information retrieval and 
modification layer which controls, modifies, or updates the data within the information 
repository. Finally, the fourth layer is the transaction management layer in which the 
requests are fulfilled.  
 
a. User Interface and Communication Layer 
Using Figure 22 as a reference, this model can further be broken down 
into more detailed components which are explained in the following paragraphs. As an 
example, the user interface (role) can be a secure connection using a web browser. The 
user communication layer contains the login verification, request manager, and provider 
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manager. The login verification would validate the role that is logging in and compare it 
to time constraints, validity, and clearance level. It employs a rule set that limits who can 
access what information and for how long. The request manager (Information Broker) 
deals with queries made by the role player for information or data located within the data 
repository. This specific request is compared against the security levels of the requested 
information and data is either provided or denied. The provider manager (data repository) 
deals with data that is input into the system by information providers (other Information 
Brokers or data repositories) and it is classified and labeled accordingly. Note from the 
figure that Information Brokers can access different instantiations of the data repository, 
but all brokers do not necessarily have access to all the same data repositories. 
Additionally, brokers can communicate with each other to potentially share data. 
b. Information Modification Layer and Transaction Management 
The information and modification layer contains application specific 
components that implement its functionality. Some of these components within the MDA 
program may include but are not limited to a distributed search, data retrieval, data 
display, and data logging.  These components are linked to the resource data repository 
which contains the data that is being searched for or requested. The resource data 
repository is responsible for managing the resources (data) that is contained within it. The 
distributed search is a search mechanism that looks for the data that the user requested by 
entering keywords, names, or time constraints into a query. This query management 
module is linked to the distributed search mechanism and allows the approved user to 
find the data he or she is looking for. The data retrieval mechanism retrieves the data 
requested by the user via the resource delivery component. This component prepares the 
data for delivery to the requestor via the user interface or data display mechanism. Data 
logging is the final component of the information and modification layer. This is where 
the accounting takes place and the roles, times, requested data, provided data, and other 
information is recorded for review. Flags or triggers could be set if there is unusual 
behavior that may require human intervention to ensure that no security break has taken  
place. The transaction management layer coordinates the transactions between the user 
and the Information Broker, providing the data immediately or informing the user of 











VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research is to help solve a problem, which is, how we can best 
achieve Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) among coalition partners in order to 
accomplish joint missions. As discussed earlier, coalitions may be very diverse and may 
include both foreign and domestic militaries, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, as 
well as private industry. We have investigated the capabilities and limitations of Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) to control the dissemination of SSA in this environment.  
Through developing case studies, we found RBAC to be a useful tool in sharing 
information between coalition members. The chief negative aspect to using RBAC is the 
initial overhead involved in establishing the roles and permissions. If this initial hurdle 
can be overcome, maintaining the system is quite simple. Users need only be assigned 
roles to attain immediate access to needed information. 
Similarly, DRBAC (and CBAC) provided a useful mechanism to scale the sharing 
of information without having to rely on a central trusted computing base. DRBAC 
wallets provided the capability to publish, validate, update and revoke delegations. 
Wallets function similar to PKI certificates and stored many delegations. TRBAC 
allowed the use of time based triggers and restrictions to be placed on roles. This is 
especially important in cases where you may want coalition members to access sensitive 
data on a temporary basis. TRBAC allows you to activate and deactivate roles in a 
manner that accomplishes this.  
Our main purpose was to model case studies in which RBAC could possibly be 
applied. We focused on the MIFC examples to determine the feasibility of applying 
RBAC to events that include coalitions internal to the United States and external non 
traditional allies. We determined that RBAC in conjunction with DRBAC and TRBAC 
could be feasible and beneficial to assisting the MDA program in working with 
coalitions. Additionally, there may be the potential for RBAC to be applied to the Radiant 
Alloy program in order to achieve their goal of Protection Level 5. Roles could be used 
instead of standard users to help simplify the process.  
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The interlinking between RBAC, Information Broker, and Radiant Alloy is 
technically possible. The elements of DRBAC and CBAC are most appropriate to align 
with the Information Broker, especially when designing a system for coalition use. It is 
scalable to large data sets and can include large quantities of entities and roles. DRBAC 
is especially useful for coalition environments and can limit information to members that 
have lower clearances or when combined with an information broker, it can also prevent 
knowledge of the source of the data which is equally important.   
 
B. RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
As suggested in this research, the implementation of RBAC in actual systems has 
been realized with some success. By all indications, this research is a first step towards 
development of an information sharing system capable of supporting large and diverse 
coalitions. There are many different converging paths that future researchers might study 
to contribute to solving the Shared Situational Awareness problem.  We offer three 
recommendations for future research in this area. 
1. Extending the Model 
The first and most obvious area for future research would be to simply extend the 
model. Out of necessity, the models and case studies developed here were of limited 
scope. These models could be expanded by using them as a baseline for constructing and 
implementing an architecture.  
2. Attribute Based Access Control 
Another related area that deserves further examination is the use of Attribute 
Based Access Controls (ABAC). ABAC grants accesses to services based on the 
attributes possessed by the requester.38 ABAC is different from traditional DAC because 
it replaces the subject by a set of attributes and the object by a set of services in the 
access control matrix. This is useful in systems in which subjects (roles) are identified by  
 
 
38 L. Wang, D. Wijesekera, and S. Jajodia. A Logic Based Framework for Attribute Based Access   
Control. In Procedure Workshop on Formal Methods in Security Engineering. (New York: ACM Press,     
October 2004), 45-55.  
75 
 
                                                
their characteristics, such as those substantiated by DRBAC wallets. These can be 
modeled as attribute sets. The model uses logic programming with set constraints to 
accomplish access control.39
3. Information Brokers  
 The Information Broker plays an important role in our concept. Information 
Brokers fulfill a need by collecting and distributing assets to consumers or users of 
information.The Information Broker creates value in the form of time and place. It can 
deliver the asset (data) at the time it is desired and to the place it is required. 40  When the 
Information Broker concept is applied to MDA, it can provide a positive benefit.  
The Information Broker concept provides two possible modes for distirbution of 
data. The first is strictly as an intermediary, which we have used extensively in our 
modeling of the problem. In this mode, the user (assigned to a role) requests data and the 
Information Broker determines the access level, acquires the data, and returns it to the 
user assuming all security checks have been passed. The second and most probable mode 
of delivery is the automatic piping mode. This method allows an existing role to have 
data automatically piped to them as an event changes. This relieves the user of having to 
request data on a continuous basis.  This mode of delivery would be an excellent addition 
to the model and developing an automatic piping system is an excellent area for future 














39Wang et al., 45-55. 
40Wayne C. Lim. Managing Software Reuse. A Comprehensive Guide to Strategically Reengineering 



























Actor - An actor is any individual or group participating in a specific activity related to 
the current operation 
 
Coalition - A group working together toward a common goal, but may not have a high 
level of trust. 
 
Coalition Based Access Control (CBAC) - An access control method that is a derivative 
of RBAC and used in conjunction with a DRBAC policy to support coalition access 
control policies. 
 
Consumer - Users of information or data that is stored within an information repository.  
 
Credential – Used with DRBAC, a subset of access permissions that establishes the 
identity of a user. Generally, a biometric, user id, password, or some other verification 
technique is used to establish identity.  
 
Delegation – In DRBAC, the term is used to describe passing on authority or permissions 
to access certain data.  
 
Distributed Role Based Access Control (DRBAC) - An access control method that is a 
derivative of RBAC and is used for systems that span multiple domains. It is also used to 




Entity – In DRBAC, the term is used to describe either resources or principals and have a 
unique PKI public identity.  
 
Information Broker – Used in the Radiant Alloy concept of operations, the Information 
Broker is an information-management service that acts as an intermediary between the 
requester of the information and the data repository. The IB will provide the requester 
with the data and at the same time, shield the source of that data from the requester.  
 
Non Government Organization (NGO) – Organizations who are not a part of any 
government and generally operated in a not for profit capacity and work to further the 
political or social goals of their members.  
 
Permissions (privileges) – Authorizations to perform some action on the system. 
 
Producer – Providers of information or data to the information repository.  
 
Radiant Alloy – Department of Defense effort to develop solutions to exchanging data 
and information across security levels and domains 
 
Role – A collection of permissions for a user who is assigned to a specific task and filling 
a predetermined position (or role)  
 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) - A method of access control in which permissions 




Shared Situational Awareness – Information sharing across domains and organization 
in which the players all have access to the same data in order to make informed decisions.  
 
Temporal Role Based Access Control (TRBAC) – Used to track the dynamic aspects of 
RBAC that includes the periodic activation and deactivation of roles over time.  
 
User – Individuals who interface with a computer.  Users receive permissions only 
through the roles in which they are assigned. 
 
Valued Attribute – In DRBAC, a valued attribute allows for control of access rights and 
supports different levels of access for the same resource.  
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